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# Kennedy The Cold War Chapter 28 Section 1 Reading Guide Answers

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Vendetta!

High Noon in the Cold War

Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November

The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis

JFK's Forgotten Crisis

John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America

The Rise And Fall of British Naval Mastery

Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War

Cuban Missile Crisis

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers

JFK

The Cambridge History of the Cold War

John F. Kennedy and America's Most Dangerous Cold War Spy Mission

Kennedy, Adenauer and the Making of the Berlin Wall, 1958-1961

Fifteen Years of Fear

JFK and the Unspeakable

The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Cold War Goes Hot

The Speeches, Statements, and Writings of John F. Kennedy

Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth

Cold War Politics

Kennedy, Adenauer and the Making of the Berlin Wall, 1958-1961

Living Through the Vietnam War

Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000

An Introductory History to the Opening Chapter of America's Cold War Story  
US Foreign Policy Since 1945  
Essential History  
Kennedy and Macmillan  
How America and France Failed in Vietnam, 1961-1963  
The Kennedy Doctrine  
Meeting the Communist Threat : Truman to Reagan  
The Most Dangerous Area in the World  
The Cambridge Companion to John F. Kennedy  
Access to History: The USA & the Cold War 1945-63 [Second Edition]  
Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War  
An Introductory History to the Opening Chapter of America's Cold War Story  
JFK and de Gaulle  
Cold War  
John F. Kennedy in His Own Words  
Let Every Nation Know

*Kennedy The Cold War Chapter 28  
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## **LEBLANC LAMBERT**

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**Vendetta!** Sourcebooks, Inc.

In March 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced the formation of the Alliance for Progress, a program dedicated to creating prosperous, socially just, democratic societies throughout Latin America. Over the next few years, the United States spent nearly \$20 billion in pursuit of the Alliance's goals, but Latin American economies barely grew, Latin American societies remained inequitable, and sixteen extraconstitutional

changes of government rocked the region. In this close, critical analysis, Stephen Rabe explains why Kennedy's grand plan for Latin America proved such a signal policy failure. Drawing on recently declassified materials, Rabe investigates the nature of Kennedy's intense anti-Communist crusade and explores the convictions that drove him to fight the Cold War throughout the Caribbean and Latin America--a region he repeatedly referred to as "the most dangerous area in the world." As Rabe acknowledges, Kennedy remains popular in the United States and Latin America, in part for the noble purposes behind the Alliance for Progress. But an unwavering determination to wage Cold War led Kennedy to compromise, even mutilate, those grand goals.

**High Noon in the Cold War** Bloomsbury Publishing  
 Bruce Riedel provides new perspective and insights into Kennedy's forgotten crisis in the most dangerous days of the cold war. The Cuban Missile Crisis defined the presidency of John F. Kennedy. But during the same week that the world stood transfixed by the possibility of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, Kennedy was also consumed by a war that has escaped history's attention, yet still significantly reverberates today: the Sino-Indian conflict. As well-armed troops from the People's Republic of China surged into Indian-held territory in October 1962, Kennedy ordered an emergency airlift of supplies to the Indian army. He engaged in diplomatic talks that kept the neighboring Pakistanis out of the fighting. The conflict came to an end with a unilateral Chinese cease-fire, relieving Kennedy of a decision to intervene militarily in support of India. Bruce Riedel, a CIA and National Security Council veteran, provides the first full narrative of this crisis, which played out during the tense negotiations with Moscow over Cuba. He also describes another, nearly forgotten episode of U.S. espionage during the war between India and China: secret U.S. support of Tibetan opposition to Chinese occupation of Tibet. He details how the United States, beginning in 1957, trained and parachuted Tibetan guerrillas into Tibet to fight Chinese military forces. The United States did not abandon this covert support until relations were normalized with China in the 1970s. Riedel tells this story of war, diplomacy, and covert action with authority and perspective. He draws on newly declassified letters between Kennedy and Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru, along with the diaries and memoirs of key players and other sources, to make

this the definitive account of JFK's forgotten crisis. This is, Riedel writes, Kennedy's finest hour as you have never read it before. Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November Cavendish Square Publishing, LLC  
 Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was a Soviet politician who led the Soviet Union during part of the Cold War as the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964 and as chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1958 to 1964. Nikita Khrushchev Chapter 1: Short History of Nikita Khrushchev Chapter 2: Party official 2.1 Kaganovich protégé 2.2 Involvement in purges Chapter 3: World War II 3.1 War against Germany Chapter 4: Rise to power 4.1 Stalin's final years 4.2 Struggle for control Chapter 5: Leader (1953–1964) 5.1 Liberalization and the arts 5.2 Political reform 5.3 Agricultural policy 5.4 Education 5.5 Anti-religious campaign 5.6 Foreign and defense policies 5.7 United States and allies 5.8 U-2 and Berlin crisis (1960–1961) 5.9 Cuban Missile Crisis and the test ban treaty (1962–1964) 5.10 Eastern Europe 5.11 China Chapter 6: Removal Chapter 7: Life in retirement Chapter 8: Death 8.1 Legacy Chapter 9: History of the Soviet Union (1953–1964) 9.1 Reforms and Khrushchev's fall The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis University Press of Amer  
 Kennedy, Adenauer and the Making of the Berlin Wall, 1958-1961 The Second Berlin Crisis, which began with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany in November 1958, has largely been interpreted by foreign policy historians as a conflict between the superpowers, in which the dependent allies - the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR - had almost no influence on the course of events

that led to the erection of the Berlin Wall. This interpretation served the political purposes of the governments involved for most of the Cold War. The Kennedy administration as leading government of the Western world could claim to have successfully managed a difficult crisis; the Adenauer administration and the Ulbricht regime could both point to Washington's and Moscow's responsibility for the division of Germany's capital; and Khrushchev, as leading statesman of the Warsaw pact, could finally deliver on some of his promises made to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, recent findings suggest that Ulbricht, not Khrushchev, was the driving force behind the decision to close the East Berlin sector. In the course of the first two years of the Kennedy administration, severe problems arose in West German-American relations. It is time to ask how the West German government's interactions with the Kennedy administration influenced the course of the crisis. President Eisenhower had seemingly managed to avoid an escalation of the Berlin crisis from 1958 to late 1960. This came at the cost of increasing pressure for his successor to find a solution. Ten months into the Kennedy administration, Berlin was divided by a wall, and American and Soviet tanks faced each other at Checkpoint Charlie. This dissertation reexamines the interactions between the Western governments, in particular between West Germany and the United States during the Second Berlin Crisis, and shows how these affected the outcome of the crisis. The first chapter serves as an introduction to the historiography of the Berlin Crisis and German-American relations in the period, especially between the Kennedy and Adenauer governments, and defines the pertinent questions; the second

chapter provides an outline of the first two years of the crisis and the Eisenhower administration's approach to Adenauer and Berlin, especially as to Western policy on Berlin when the Eisenhower administration handed over the reins; the third to fifth chapters trace the Kennedy administration's and Chancellor Adenauer's interactions during the crisis in 1961 with particular regard to the actual sealing off of West Berlin, and the last chapter finally serves as an overview of the immediate aftermath. I argue that four key assumptions about the Berlin Wall crisis in 1961 can no longer be upheld: 1. The claim that Kennedy had stood firm on Berlin and merely continued the Eisenhower posture on Berlin is wrong. Instead, the Kennedy administration attempted to find new approaches to Berlin and Germany in line with its general revision of US foreign policy. 2. The notion that the closing of the sector border came as a surprise is not supported by the documents. President Kennedy had been informed numerous times that a closing of the sector border could be expected within the year. 3. Adenauer's policy to prevent diplomatic recognition of the GDR contributed to an escalation of Washington's search for alternative policy options, rather than slowing them. The West German election campaign in 1961 further limited the chancellor's willingness to make changes to his foreign policy. The Kennedy administration eventually sought accommodation with Khrushchev without consulting Bonn. 4. Inherent conceptual mistakes in Kennedy's early foreign policy agenda exacerbated the crisis, rather than contributed to its eventual solution. An additional lack of trust between West Germany and the United States complicated and delayed the attempt to find a more coherent,

*JFK's Forgotten Crisis* Lulu Press, Inc

The relationship between President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was a complex factor in the creation of Anglo-American foreign policies in the early 1960's. Kennedy and Macmillan offers a systematic account of this personal friendship and questions the impact of the relationship, in and of itself, on Cold War policymaking. Assessing the nature of this relationship contributes to a greater understanding of Anglo-American relations, and also provides a tool for understanding the complex nature of international diplomacy during the Cold War. This behind-the-scenes look at the decision-making process reveals the reality of the statecraft and personal diplomacy during the Cold War.

John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America Hourly History

In this provocative new book, the distinguished diplomatic historian Thomas G. Paterson explores why and how Americans have perceived and exaggerated the Communist threat in the last half century. Telling the story through rich analysis and substantial research in private papers, government archives, oral histories, contemporary writings, and scholarly works, Paterson explains the origins and evolution of United States global intervention. In penetrating essays on the ideas and programs of Harry S. Truman, George F. Kennan, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, John F. Kennedy, Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Ronald Reagan, as well as on the views of dissenters from the prevailing Cold War mentality, Paterson reveals the tenacity and momentum of American thinking about threats from abroad. Paterson offers a thorough

review of postwar American attitudes toward totalitarianism, the causes of international conflict, and foreign aid, and he then demonstrates how Truman acted upon these views, launched the containment doctrine, and exercised American power in both Europe and Asia. A fresh look at Eisenhower's policy in the Middle East explains how the United States became a major player in that volatile region. Paterson also presents an incisive critique of Kennedy's foreign policy, describing an administration propelled by lessons from Truman's era, an assertive, "can-do" style, and a grandiose notion of America's nation-building responsibilities in the Third World. Arrogance, ignorance, and impatience, Paterson argues, combined with familiar exaggerations of Soviet capabilities and intentions, to produce a rash of crises, from the Bay of Pigs and missile crisis in Cuba to the war in Vietnam. Other chapters study the flawed record of 1970s detente, CIA covert actions and the failure of congressional oversight from the 1940s to the present, and Reagan's rewriting of the history of the Vietnam War. In the last chapter, Paterson demolishes the argument that the Vietnam War could have been won and probes the analogy between Vietnam and Central America in the 1980s. Americans did not invent the Communist threat, Paterson contends, but they have certainly exaggerated it, nurturing a trenchant anti-communism that has had a devastating effect on international relations and American institutions. An important backdrop to recent foreign policy, *Meeting the Communist Threat* combines extensive scholarship and perceptive analysis to provide a vivid account of Cold War policy in America. *The Rise And Fall of British Naval Mastery* Cambridge University Press

The United States and the Soviet Union were two of the nations that defeated Nazi Germany in World War II. Yet their systems of government were completely different. These differences soon developed into the Cold War. Both sides became bitter enemies. But there was no actual fighting. That situation nearly changed in 1961. The Soviets secretly installed missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba. These missiles could reach many cities in the United States. When President John F. Kennedy learned about these weapons, he confronted Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev. The world teetered on the brink of a nuclear war. This is the story of that chilling event.

*Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War* Stanford University  
 Kennedy, Adenauer and the Making of the Berlin Wall, 1958-1961  
 The Second Berlin Crisis, which began with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany in November 1958, has largely been interpreted by foreign policy historians as a conflict between the superpowers, in which the dependent allies - the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR - had almost no influence on the course of events that led to the erection of the Berlin Wall. This interpretation served the political purposes of the governments involved for most of the Cold War. The Kennedy administration as leading government of the Western world could claim to have successfully managed a difficult crisis; the Adenauer administration and the Ulbricht regime could both point to Washington's and Moscow's responsibility for the division of Germany's capital; and Khrushchev, as leading statesman of the Warsaw pact, could finally deliver on some of his promises made to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, recent

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**Cuban Missile Crisis** University Press of Kentucky

The Cambridge Companion to John F. Kennedy explores the creation, and afterlife, of an American icon.

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers Manchester University Press

The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union lasted from the end of World War II until the end of the 1980s. Over the course of five decades, they never came to blows directly. Rather, these two world superpowers competed in other arenas that would touch almost every corner of the globe. Inside you will read about... ✓ What Was the Cold War? ✓ The Origins of the Cold War ✓ World War II and the Beginning of the Cold War ✓ The Cold War in the 1950s ✓ The Cold War in the 1960s ✓ The Cold War in the 1970s ✓ The Cold War in the 1980s and the End of the Cold War Both interfered in the affairs of other countries to win allies for their opposing ideologies. In the process, governments were destabilized, ideas silenced, revolutions broke out, and culture was controlled. This overview of the Cold War provides the story of how these two countries came to oppose one another, and the impact it had on them and others around the world.

JFK Routledge

Let Every Nation Know is the first book of its kind—a historical biography in Kennedy's own words. Combining a remarkable audio CD of Kennedy's most famous speeches, debates and press conferences with the insights of two of America's preeminent historians, the result is a unique look at the world-changing words and presidency of John F. Kennedy. Robert Dallek, author of the #1 bestselling biography *An Unfinished Life*, and Terry Golway, author of *Washington's General*, bring to life the soaring oratory,

marvelous wit and the intense drama of Kennedy's words and the events they evoke. "I had forgotten just how powerful these speeches were but the CD brings them to life once more and Dallek and Golway have done a masterful job of putting them into context."-Bob Schieffer, CBS News

*The Cambridge History of the Cold War* W. W. Norton & Company

In June 1961, Nikita Khrushchev called Berlin "the most dangerous place on earth." He knew what he was talking about. Much has been written about the Cuban Missile Crisis a year later, but the Berlin Crisis of 1961 was more decisive in shaping the Cold War-and more perilous. It was in that hot summer that the Berlin Wall was constructed, which would divide the world for another twenty-eight years. Then two months later, and for the first time in history, American and Soviet fighting men and tanks stood arrayed against each other, only yards apart. One mistake, one nervous soldier, one overzealous commander-and the tripwire would be sprung for a war that could go nuclear in a heartbeat. On one side was a young, untested U.S. president still reeling from the Bay of Pigs disaster and a humiliating summit meeting that left him grasping for ways to respond. It would add up to be one of the worst first-year foreign policy performances of any modern president. On the other side, a Soviet premier hemmed in by the Chinese, East Germans, and hardliners in his own government. With an all-important Party Congress approaching, he knew Berlin meant the difference not only for the Kremlin's hold on its empire-but for his own hold on the Kremlin. Neither man really understood the other, both tried cynically to manipulate events. And so, week by week, they crept closer to the brink. Based on a wealth of new documents and interviews,

filled with fresh-sometimes startling-insights, written with immediacy and drama, *Berlin 1961* is an extraordinary look at key events of the twentieth century, with powerful applications to these early years of the twenty-first. Includes photographs

**John F. Kennedy and America's Most Dangerous Cold War Spy Mission** Brookings Institution Press

A riveting history of the epic orbital flight that put America back into the space race. If the United States couldn't catch up to the Soviets in space, how could it compete with them on Earth? That was the question facing John F. Kennedy at the height of the Cold War—a perilous time when the Soviet Union built the wall in Berlin, tested nuclear bombs more destructive than any in history, and beat the United States to every major milestone in space. The race to the heavens seemed a race for survival—and America was losing. On February 20, 1962, when John Glenn blasted into orbit aboard *Friendship 7*, his mission was not only to circle the planet; it was to calm the fears of the free world and renew America's sense of self-belief. *Mercury Rising* re-creates the tension and excitement of a flight that shifted the momentum of the space race and put the United States on the path to the moon. Drawing on new archival sources, personal interviews, and previously unpublished notes by Glenn himself, *Mercury Rising* reveals how the astronaut's heroics lifted the nation's hopes in what Kennedy called the "hour of maximum danger."

**Kennedy, Adenauer and the Making of the Berlin Wall, 1958-1961** ABDO Publishing Company

Provides an account of the most dangerous moment of the Cold War--the Cuban Missile Crisis

**Fifteen Years of Fear** Mitchell Lane



When Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy fell out of favor with the Democratic Roosevelt administration, due to appeasement, the political baton in the Kennedy family went to Joe Jr. He was killed in World War II in 1944 and, from that time on, Joe Sr. focused all his attentions on his second son, John F. Kennedy. The young Kennedy experienced some celebrity as a war hero and having written a modest bestseller, JFK was keen to pick up the baton. He was a willing and enthusiastic candidate who, following a life in the military, was anxious to make his mark on Congress. Having served as a Senator, he found himself in a race for the White House in 1960 with Republican, Richard Nixon, appearing on the first televised Presidential Election debates. It was a close run race, but JFK was assured of the Presidency with less than 100,000 votes to spare. He took up office during a difficult period in US political history, where his policies on the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Civil Rights, and war in Vietnam were much scrutinized. However, behind the Hollywood-style life that he and his wife, Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy, portrayed hid some dark secrets. Tragedies and health issues plagued the Kennedy family, and JFK's less-than-discreet romantic liaisons, were possibly a threat to national security at various points during the Kennedy administration. Was JFK's assassination a conspiracy, or was Lee Harvey Oswald acting alone when he shot the President on November 22, 1963?

JFK and the Unspeakable Rowman & Littlefield

"America's road to disaster in Vietnam has been endlessly chronicled, but Sean L. McLaughlin takes a fresh approach to that familiar story." —James Hershberg, George Washington University Despite French President Charles de Gaulle's

persistent efforts to constructively share French experience and use his resources to help engineer an American exit from Vietnam, the Kennedy administration responded to de Gaulle's peace initiatives with bitter silence and inaction. The administration's response ignited a series of events that dealt a massive blow to American prestige across the globe, resulting in the deaths of over fifty-eight thousand American soldiers and turning hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese citizens into refugees. This history of Franco-American relations during the Kennedy presidency explores how and why France and the US disagreed over the proper western strategy for the Vietnam War. France clearly had more direct political experience in Vietnam, but France's postwar decolonization cemented Kennedy's perception that the French were characterized by a toxic mixture of shortsightedness, stubbornness, and indifference to the collective interests of the West. At no point did the Kennedy administration give serious consideration to de Gaulle's proposals or entertain the notion of using his services as an honest broker in order to disengage from a situation that was rapidly spiraling out of control. Kennedy's Francophobia, the roots of which appear in a selection of private writings from Kennedy's undergraduate years at Harvard, biased his decision-making. This book explores how the course of action Kennedy chose in 1963, a rejection of the French peace program, all but handcuffed Lyndon Johnson into formally entering a war he knew the United States had little chance of winning.

The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Cold War Goes Hot Penguin UK In the first analysis of the start of the Cold War from a Soviet viewpoint, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe draws on Russian source

material to reach some startling conclusions. She challenges the prevailing orthodoxy of Western historians to show how Moscow saw the presence of US troops in Europe in the 1940s and early 1950s as advantageous rather than as a check on Soviet ambitions. The author points to a complex web of concerns that fuelled Moscow's actions, and explores how the Soviet leadership, and Stalin in particular, responded to American policy. She shows how the Soviet experience of the United States and Europe, both before, during and after the Second World War, led Moscow to a policy that was not simply fuelled by anti-Americanism. Six chapters cover events from the wartime conferences of 1943 until the death of Stalin. A final chapter places the book in the context of the current debate over the causes of the Cold War.

*The Speeches, Statements, and Writings of John F. Kennedy*

Turner Publishing Company

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

[Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth](#)

The Origins of the Cold War

Paul Kennedy's classic naval history, now updated with a new introduction by the author This acclaimed book traces Britain's rise and fall as a sea power from the Tudors to the present day. Challenging the traditional view that the British are natural 'sons

of the waves', he suggests instead that the country's fortunes as a significant maritime force have always been bound up with its economic growth. In doing so, he contributes significantly to the centuries-long debate between 'continental' and 'maritime' schools of strategy over Britain's policy in times of war. Setting British naval history within a framework of national, international, economic, political and strategic considerations, he offers a fresh approach to one of the central questions in British history. A new introduction extends his analysis into the twenty-first century and reflects on current American and Chinese ambitions for naval mastery. 'Excellent and stimulating' Correlli Barnett 'The first scholar to have set the sweep of British Naval history against the background of economic history' Michael Howard, Sunday Times 'By far the best study that has ever been done on the subject ... a sparkling and apt quotation on practically every page' Daniel A. Baugh, International History Review 'The best single-volume study of Britain and her naval past now available to us' Jon Sumida, Journal of Modern History

**Cold War Politics** Character-19

A study of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis chronicles the standoff between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over the placement of missiles in Cuba, analyzing the events and personalities involved to reveal how close the world came to all-out nuclear war.

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