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# Allies At War America Europe And The Crisis Over Iraq

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Allies At War

Global Allies

Beyond NATO

Allies in War: Britain and America against the Axis Powers, 1940-1945

A Transatlantic Bargain for the 21st Century

The Bitter Road to Freedom

America's Entangling Alliances

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The End of Alliance

The War of Democracy, the Allies' Statement; Chapters on the Fundamental Significance of the Struggle for a New Europe

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## CAREY CANTRELL

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*Allies At War* JHU Press

Is America's alliance system so quietly effective that politicians and voters fail to appreciate its importance in delivering the security they take for granted? For the first century and a half of its existence, the United States had just one alliance—a valuable but highly controversial military arrangement with France. Largely out of deference to George Washington's warnings against the dangers of "entangling alliances," subsequent American presidents did not consider entering another until the Second World War. Then everything suddenly changed. Between 1948 and 1955, US leaders extended defensive security guarantees to twenty-three countries in Europe and Asia. Seventy years later, the United States had allied with thirty-seven. In *Shields of the Republic*, Mira Rapp-Hooper reveals the remarkable success of America's unprecedented system of alliances. During the Cold War, a grand strategy focused on allied defense, deterrence, and assurance helped to keep the peace at far lower material and political costs than its critics allege. When the Soviet Union collapsed, however, the United States lost the adversary the system was designed to combat. Its alliances remained without a core strategic logic, leaving them newly vulnerable. Today the alliance system is threatened from without and within. China and Russia seek to break America's alliances through conflict and non-military erosion. Meanwhile, US politicians and voters are increasingly skeptical of alliances' costs and benefits and believe we may be better off without them. But what if the alliance system is a victim of its own quiet success? Rapp-Hooper argues that America's national security requires alliances that deter and defend against military and non-military conflict alike. The alliance system is past due for a post-Cold War overhaul, but it remains critical to the country's safety and prosperity in the 21st century.

*Global Allies* University Press of Kentucky

This volume offers the first detailed statement by a contingent of RAND thinkers on the contours of a redefined Atlantic partnership.

*Beyond NATO* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers

As a former U.S. diplomat in Europe, John W. Holmes watched the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fulfill its purpose with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In *The United States and Europe after the Cold War*, he explores the possibilities for future transatlantic relations in light of NATO's ebbing usefulness. Finding that a basis still exists for an alliance between the United States and the European Union, Holmes sets forth a comprehensive plan for establishing an association as long-lasting and profitable as the one now drawing to a close. Holmes advocates a solid foundation for the alliance, one that approaches a formal economic union. He lists key considerations for the construction of a new, effective relationship, including the growing impatience of Americans and Europeans with substantial U.S. military contingents in Europe, the changing nature of intra-European relations, and the need for a distribution of power more equitable than that of NATO.

**Allies in War: Britain and America against the Axis Powers, 1940-1945** Palala Press

The same may be said of the transatlantic bargain that has underpinned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since its founding and framed the relationship between the United States and its European allies. A source of both enduring stability as well as perpetual discord, the transatlantic bargain has always been a balancing act between a U.S. commitment to European security in return for a position of U.S. leadership and dominance of NATO, and the expectation that Europeans would accelerate efforts to provide for their own defense. Such a balance remains the essence of the bargain in the 21st century, but the context within which the bargain must operate has changed dramatically, and the nature of America's relationship with the Alliance is perhaps under more scrutiny than ever before. In the context of the contemporary security environment— one characterized by the complexity of modern operations requiring a range of civilian and military capabilities, and a changing world characterized by the diffusion of power and the rise of China—the Atlantic Alliance, as well as the transatlantic bargain that underpins it, must reorient itself to its changing landscape. The combined experiences of NATO's missions in the Balkans, a decade-long expeditionary operation in Afghanistan, and its most recent mission in Libya, coupled with a climate of fiscal austerity on both sides of the Atlantic, have placed the bargain under immense strain. During the first Barack Obama administration, it became evident that Washington is increasingly less willing to tolerate what it sees as fundamental gaps within the Alliance—in defense spending, capabilities, and military transformation. As a result, Washington is signaling more forcefully than ever to its European allies, as well as NATO partners, that they must take on a greater share of Alliance burdens, accelerate efforts to generate capabilities and resources, and move away from a deeply entrenched culture of dependency. Revising the bargain requires new ways of thinking, both in the United States and Europe. There are signs, however, that not only is there a consensus on the need to revise the transatlantic bargain, but that the outlines of what such a bargain might look like are beginning to emerge. U.S. rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific and a reduction in U.S. forces in Europe in no way signal a turning away from Europe, only recognition that the United States inhabits a changing world; this is a process that essentially has been under way since the end of the Cold War, but has been accelerated in the context of the challenges and demands of a decade of war, a climate of austerity, and the rise of new centers of power. U.S. political and military leaders should continue to affirm NATO's enduring importance and value for America. The United States has already begun to signal a shift in mindset; the U.S. military is reconfiguring its force posture to reflect the wider strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, but to offset European fears over a reduced U.S. commitment to Europe, the U.S. military should, and will, continue to support regular rotational deployments to conduct joint training with its European allies and ensure both sides are able to operate together on future missions. The U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR) will continue to play a role—albeit reduced in size—in building partner capacity and fostering interoperability through ongoing training and exercises with European allies. Continuing multinational Landpower exercises of the kind currently undertaken by USAREUR will be another valuable tool in

demonstrating the U.S. military's ongoing commitment to capacity building and partnership in Europe.

A Transatlantic Bargain for the 21st Century University of Pennsylvania Press

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*The Bitter Road to Freedom* CreateSpace

In struggling to regain France's leading position in Europe, the French leadership under Charles de Gaulle sought on the one hand an independent nuclear force, and, on the other, a strengthening of Europe with a Franco-German alliance at its core. Both of these policies provoked friction with the United States; both will now have to be revised, the author asserts, after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a powerful, reunited Germany.

America's Entangling Alliances New York : Simon and Schuster

This compelling history brings to life the watershed year of 1948, when the United States reversed its long-standing position of political and military isolation from Europe and agreed to an "entangling alliance" with ten European nations. Not since 1800, when the United States ended its alliance with France, had the nation made such a commitment. The historic North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, but the often-contentious negotiations stretched throughout the preceding year.

Lawrence S. Kaplan, the leading historian of NATO, traces the tortuous and dramatic process, which struggled to reconcile the conflicting concerns on the part of the future partners. Although the allies could agree on the need to cope with the threat of Soviet-led Communism and on the vital importance of an American association with a unified Europe, they differed over the means of achieving these ends. The United States had to contend with domestic isolationist suspicions of Old World intentions, the military's worries about over extension of the nation's resources, and the apparent incompatibility of the projected treaty with the UN charter. For their part, Europeans had to be convinced that American demands to abandon their traditions would provide the sense of security that economic and political recovery from World War II required. Kaplan brings to life the colorful diplomats and politicians arrayed on both sides of the debate. The end result was a remarkably durable treaty and alliance that has linked the fortunes of America and Europe for over fifty years. Despite differences that have persisted and occasionally flared over the past fifty years, NATO continues to bind America and Europe in the twenty-first century. Kaplan's detailed and lively account draws on a wealth of primary sources--newspapers, memoirs, and diplomatic documents--to

illuminate how the United States came to assume international obligations it had scrupulously avoided for the previous 150 years.

An Alliance at Risk [London] : A. Deutsch

Includes material on Konrad Adenauer, Douglas MacArthur in Japan, Dean Acheson, Jean Monnet, Marshall Plan, John Foster Dulles, John F. Kennedy, Charles de Gaulle, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Willy Brandt, detente, Henry Kissinger, trilateralism, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan.

Shields of the Republic Palala Press

In the post-9/11 era of heightened security awareness, conflicting strategies for containing and combating security risks have strained relations between the United States and the European Union despite common goals. Atlantic Bridges argues that the U.S. must resist the temptation to focus its diplomatic efforts on bilateral agreements with those European countries in closest alignment to it, and instead use its dependable and durable partners among the central and eastern European states to develop more predictable and productive relations with the EU for the sake of long-term stability.

NATO 1948 Strategic Studies Institute

The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was one of the most important accomplishments of American diplomacy in countering the Soviet threat during the early days of the Cold War. Why and how such a reversal of a 150-year nonalignment policy by the United States was brought about, and how the goals of the treaty became a reality, are questions addressed here by a leading scholar of NATO. The importance of restoring Europe to strength and stability in the post-World War II years was as obvious to America as to its allies, but the means of achieving that goal were far from clear. The problem for European statesmen was how to secure much-needed American economic and military aid without sacrificing political independence. For American policymakers, in contrast, a degree of American control was seen as an essential *quid pro quo*. As Mr. Kaplan shows, the lengthy negotiations of 1947 and 1948 were chiefly concerned with reconciling these opposing views. For the Truman administration, the difficulties of achieving a treaty acceptable to the allies were matched by those of winning its acceptance by Congress and the public. Many Americans saw such an "entangling alliance" as a threat not only to American security but to the viability of the United Nations. Mr. Kaplan demonstrates the tortuous course of the debate on the treaty and the pivotal role of the communist invasion of South Korea in its ultimate approval. This authoritative study offers a timely reevaluation of the origins of an alliance that continues to play a critical role in the balance of power and in the prospects for world peace.

*Fading Partnership* Rowman & Littlefield

It was Winston Churchill who, in his speech at Fulton, Missouri, advocated a 'special relationship between the British Commonwealth...and the United States...the continuance of intimate relationships between our military advisers, leading to the common study of potential dangers'. Through the eyes of Churchill, Roosevelt and their successors, Sir Robin Renwick traces the development of the Anglo-American relationship since the desperate summer of 1940 and the part it played in the shaping of the post-war world. Detecting once again a whiff of the 1930s in the air, Sir Robin concludes that, as one of the ties that bind Europe and North America, the relationship remains an important one, and not only to Britain and the United States. There are many on both

sides of the Atlantic who will think that the world would have been poorer without it. Nor has the world yet assumed so secure and predictable a form as to render it redundant.

Architects of Delusion Wentworth Press

How and why did NATO, a Cold War military alliance created in 1949 to counter Stalin's USSR, become the cornerstone of new security order for post-Cold War Europe? Why, instead of retreating from Europe after communism's collapse, did the U.S. launch the greatest expansion of the American commitment to the old continent in decades? Written by a high-level insider, *Opening NATO's Door* provides a definitive account of the ideas, politics, and diplomacy that went into the historic decision to expand NATO to Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on the still-classified archives of the U.S. Department of State, Ronald D. Asmus recounts how and why American policy makers, against formidable odds at home and abroad, expanded NATO as part of a broader strategy to overcome Europe's Cold War divide and to modernize the Alliance for a new era. Asmus was one of the earliest advocates and intellectual architects of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism in the early 1990s and subsequently served as a top aide to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, responsible for European security issues. He was involved in the key negotiations that led to NATO's decision to extend invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and finally, the U.S. Senate's ratification of enlargement. Asmus documents how the Clinton Administration sought to develop a rationale for a new NATO that would bind the U.S. and Europe together as closely in the post-Cold War era as they had been during the fight against communism. For the Clinton Administration, NATO enlargement became the centerpiece of a broader agenda to modernize the U.S.-European strategic partnership for the future. That strategy reflected an American commitment to the spread of democracy and Western values, the importance attached to modernizing Washington's key alliances for an increasingly globalized world, and the fact that the Clinton Administration looked to Europe as America's natural partner in addressing the challenges of the twenty-first century. As the Alliance weighs its the future following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. and prepares for a second round of enlargement, this book is required reading about the first post-Cold War effort to modernize NATO for a new era.

**A Fraternity of Arms** Yale University Press

Ten years have elapsed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, which served as a fitting symbol for the end of the Cold War. That historic juncture brought into question the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has served Alliance members so well since its founding in 1949. It also brought into question the rationale for America's continued deep involvement in European security affairs. With the gradual realization that the Russian menace is essentially dead, at least for the next 10 to 15 years and perhaps longer, and with NATO's missions having evolved well beyond the original purpose of territorial defense, debate on both sides of the Atlantic has begun to intensify concerning the vital issue of where NATO should be headed and America's relation to the Alliance. To bring an array of informed voices to the debate, four institutions--the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies of the University of Chicago, and the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago--joined hands to sponsor a symposium titled *The Future*

of U.S. Military Presence in Europe, held at the University of Chicago on August 4, 1999. The present book is an outgrowth of this symposium. It is not designed to set forth a literal record of words and events in the mold of the traditional symposium proceedings, but rather is organized as an anthology of individual chapters complemented by selected questions, answers, and comments by symposium participants and attendees.

**The Western Alliance** Palgrave Macmillan

In the immediate aftermath of the events of September 11, people around the world - and Europeans in particular - came together in unprecedented demonstrations of compassion for and solidarity with the people of the United States. Since then, however, relations between Europe and America have become perilously contentious. The new unilateral and pre-emptive tone of US foreign policy, wedded to old fears of American hegemony and an irreducible strain of anti-Americanism, have alienated and angered Europeans, even as Europe's refusal to endorse key American policies has drawn charges of ingratitude and irrelevance. dates back to the end of the Cold War and poses profound dangers for the intertwined futures of America, Europe and the world. In this book, he argues that although the ties that have united Europe and America for decades remain stronger than the propagandists of a transatlantic schism would have us believe, deepening transatlantic differences foster an increasing mistrust that prevents constructive dialogue and action. perspective and tracing the evolution and progressive alteration of European-American relations from the post-war period to the Iraqi crisis. Stressing the need for strong transatlantic solidarity in the new global environment, Cohen-Tanugi sets forth the case and prerequisites for such co-operation, calling on Europe to assume fully its responsibilities on the world stage and on America to address the contradictions and inadequacies of its foreign policy and become more attentive to the international community, its sensitivities and rules. Envisioning what this renewed partnership might look like in the future, he concludes that in a world plagued by profound disorder and rabid anti-Westernism, the distance between the United States and the European Union must be bridged to propagate the democratic values they share, confront global challenges, and ensure the stability of the world.

The End of Alliance Bloomsbury Publishing

*Allies at Odds* examines America's Vietnam policy from 1961 to 1968 in an international context by focusing on the United States' relationship with its European partners France, West Germany, and Great Britain. The European response to America's Vietnam policy provides a framework to assess this important chapter in recent American history within the wider perspective of international relations. Equally significant, the respective approaches to the "Vietnam question" by the Europeans and Americans reveal the ongoing challenge for nation-states of transcending narrowly defined state-centered policies for a global perspective pursuant of common goals among the trans-Atlantic allies. Blang explores the failure of France, West Germany, and Great Britain to significantly influence American policy-making.

The War of Democracy, the Allies' Statement; Chapters on the Fundamental Significance of the Struggle for a New Europe Columbia University Press

Introduction -- 1. Golden age : years of reconstruction -- 2. Thinking of Europe and beyond : Nixon and Kissinger's priorities -- 3. Special relationships : a journey to a continent in transition -- 4. Living with deficits : economic predicaments -- 5. Downward spiral : monetary turmoil and the end of the

old order -- 6 Turning point : the United States and the end of "benign hegemony" -- Conclusion.

Global Allies Greenwood

A thorough analysis of where U.S./European relations have gone wrong--and how to set them right ALLIES AT WAR is the first and most comprehensive assessment of what went wrong between America and Europe during the crisis over Iraq and is based on extensive interviews with policymakers in the United States and Europe. It puts the crisis over Iraq in historical context by examining US-Europe relations since World War II and shows how the alliance traditionally managed to overcome its many internal difficulties and crises. It describes how the deep strategic differences that emerged at the end of the Cold War and the disputes over the Balkans and the Middle East during the Clinton years already had some analysts questioning whether the Alliance could survive. It shows how the Bush administration's unilateral diplomacy and world-view helped bring already simmering tensions to a boil, and describes in depth the events leading up to the Iraq crisis of 2003. Gordon and Shapiro explain how powerful forces such rising American power and the September 11 terrorist attacks have made relations between America and Europe increasingly difficult. But the authors argue that the split over Iraq was not inevitable: it was the result of misguided decisions and unnecessary provocations on both sides. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that claims that the Iraq war signaled the effective end of the Atlantic Alliance, the authors warn that assuming the end of the Alliance could quickly become a self-fulfilling prophesy: leaving the United States isolated, resented, and responsible for bearing the burdens of maintaining international security largely alone. In response to those who argue that the Atlantic Alliance is no longer viable or necessary, ALLIES AT WAR demonstrates that even after Iraq, the United States and Europe can work together, and indeed must if they wish to effectively address the most pressing problems of our age. The book makes concrete proposals for restoring transatlantic relations and updating the alliance to meet new challenges like global terrorism and the transformation of an unstable Middle East.

The United States and Europe After the Cold War Harvard University Press

This major work transcends the conventional sub-cultures of academic history by bringing economic, social, military, and diplomatic history back together, where they belong. Allies at War represents a collaborative effort among British, American, and Russian scholars - with the Russian contributions being among the first fruits of access to Soviet archives - in which all the historians have attempted

to set aside the accumulation of patriotic myth and political ideology that have characterized many Cold War studies of World War II. Strategy, economy, the home front, and foreign policy are each studied 'nationally' and then in the context of the other members of the alliance. Allies at War therefore represents a pioneering attempt to see the wartime alliance as both 'national' and 'international' history.

*Fighting with Allies* Rowman & Littlefield

America's Entangling Alliances challenges the belief that the US resists international alliances. By documenting thirty-four alliances—categorized as defense pacts, military coalitions, or security partnerships—Davidson finds that the US demand for allies is best explained by looking at variance in its relative power and the threats it has faced.

The War of Democracy, the Allies' Statement; [Microform] Chapters on the Fundamental Significance of the Struggle for a New Europe McGraw Hill Professional

The commencement of war in Iraq in 2003 was met with a variety of reactions around the globe. In *Architects of Delusion*, Simon Serfaty presents a historical analysis of how and why the decision to wage war was endorsed by some of America's main European allies, especially Britain, and opposed by others, especially France and Germany. Tony Blair, George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroeder were, Serfaty argues, the architects of one of the most serious crises in postwar transatlantic relations. These four heads of state were the victims not only of their personal delusions but also of those of the nations they led. They all played the hand that their countries had dealt them—the forceful hand of a righteous America, the principled acquiescence of a faithful Britain, the determined intransigence of a quarrelsome France, and the ambiguous "new way" of a recast Germany. Serfaty's deft interweaving of the political histories and cultures of the four countries and the personalities of their leaders transcends the Europe-bashing debate sparked by the Iraq invasion. He contends that not one of these four leaders was entirely right or entirely wrong in his approach to the others or to the issues, before and during the war. For the resulting wounds to heal, though, and for the continuity of transatlantic relations, he reminds us that the United States and France must end their estrangement, France and Britain must resolve their differences, Germany must carry its weight relative to both France and Britain, and the United States must exert the same visionary leadership for the twenty-first century that it showed during its rise to preeminence in the twentieth century.

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