
Ethics Inventing Right And Wrong John Leslie Mackie

Ethics for A-Level

Essays in Moral Skepticism

Value Theory

Moral Thinking

The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism

An Introduction to Ethics in Robotics and AI

Problems of Rationality

Reasons and Recognition

Moral Fictionalism

Utilitarianism and Beyond

Sorting Out Ethics

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Ethics for A-Level Cornell University Press
R. M. Hare writes in his Preface: 'I offer this taxonomy of ethical theories to all those who are lost in the moral maze, including many of my philosophical colleagues. They are lost because, like most of those who hold forth on moral questions in the media, they have no map of the maze. This is has been my aim to provide.'
Sorting Out Ethics is a characteristically

lucid and lively survey of rival ethical theories by one of the most influential moral philosophers of the century. It also constitutes a definitive summary of Hare's own fundamental ethical position.
Essays in Moral Skepticism Penguin UK
This volume draws together Richard Joyce's work from the last decade on moral skepticism, the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. Joyce's radical view is that in making moral judgments speakers attempt to state truths but that the world isn't furnished with the properties and relations necessary to render such judgments true.

Value Theory Oxford University Press
The late J. L. Mackie and his work were a focus for much of the best philosophical thinking in the Oxford tradition. His moral thought centres on that most fundamental issue in moral philosophy - the issue of whether our moral judgements are in some way objective. The contributors to this volume, first published in 1985, are among the most distinguished figures in moral philosophy, and their essays in tribute to John Mackie present views at the forefront of the subject. Five of the essays give a new understanding of the objectivity of moral judgements. These are

by Simon Blackburn, R.M. Hare, John McDowell, Susan Hurley and Bernard Williams. The remaining contributors – Philippa Foot, Steven Lukes, Amartya Sen, David Wiggins – give their attention to problems which are equally compelling, such as the defence of a moral outlook based on a conception of a need and of what follows from it. The volume also includes the addresses given by Simon Blackburn and George Cawkwell at the memorial service for John Mackie, and a list of his publications, compiled by Joan Mackie.

Moral Thinking Ethics

Aristotle's teaching on the subject of happiness has been a topic of intense philosophical debate in recent years. Did he hold that happiness consists in the exercise of all the virtues, moral and intellectual, or that supreme happiness is to be found only in the practice of philosophical contemplation? The question is vital to the relevance of his ethics today. Anthony Kenny helped to set the terms of the debate a quarter of a century ago. Later, in his book *The Aristotelian Ethics* (Clarendon Press, 1978), he argued that Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics had no less

claim than the better-known Nicomachean Ethics to be taken as a late and definitive statement of Aristotle's position. In this new book he refines his view of the relationship between the two treatises and shows how to reach a consensus on the interpretation of the texts. Aristotle's admirers struggle to read a comprehensive account of the supreme happiness into the Nicomachean Ethics; Dr Kenny argues that those who are prepared to take the neglected Eudemian Ethics with equal seriousness are able to preserve their admiration intact without doing violence to any of the relevant texts.

The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism University of Chicago Press
What kind of properties are moral qualities, such as rightness, badness, etc? Some ethicists doubt that there are any such properties; they maintain that thinking that something is morally wrong (for example) is comparable to thinking that something is a unicorn or a ghost. These "moral error theorists" argue that the world simply does not contain the kind of properties or objects necessary to render our moral judgments true. This radical form of moral skepticism was

championed by the philosopher John Mackie (1917-1981). This anthology is a collection of philosophical essays critically examining Mackie's view.

[An Introduction to Ethics in Robotics and AI](#) Oxford University Press

A systematic analysis considers the objectivity of ethics, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist worldview and its role in a person's rational lifespan.

[Problems of Rationality](#) Oxford University Press

Why is real-world experience vital to a mature appreciation of any philosophical system? Why is the search for objective truth a trickier proposition than it seems at first glance? American psychologist and philosopher WILLIAM JAMES (1842-1910), brother of novelist Henry James, was a groundbreaking researcher at Harvard University, author of such works as *Principles of Psychology* (1890) and *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (1902), and one of the most influential academics of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Here, in a series of essays first published in book form in 1909, and considered a sequel to his

series of lectures collected in *Pragmatism* (also available from Cosimo), James explores these questions as he discusses: [the function of cognition [humanism and truth [the relation between knower and known [the essence of humanism [the meaning of the word truth [the absolute and strenuous life [and more.

Reasons and Recognition Oxford University Press, USA

First Published in 1980. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Moral Fictionalism Springer Science & Business Media

Conventional thinking about the mind, dating back to Aristotle envisions the emotions as being directed and determined by rational thought. The author argues that the conventional picture of rationality is fundamentally false and has little to do with how real human beings actually behave.

Utilitarianism and Beyond OUP Oxford
Calls for an end to religion's role in dictating morality, demonstrating how the scientific community's understandings about the human brain may enable the establishment of secular codes of

behavior.

Sorting Out Ethics Clarendon Press

Tests the views and metaphor of 19th-century utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick against a variety of contemporary views on ethics, determining that they are defensible and thus providing a defense of objectivism in ethics and of hedonistic utilitarianism.
The Moral Landscape Harvard University Press

'An immensely rich book.... The book is extremely careful, resourceful, and reasonable. It is essential reading for everyone interested in ethics.' -Mind
Cambridge Pragmatism Oxford University Press

This book presents a comprehensive defence of legal positivism on the basis of a novel account of social conventions. Marmor argues that the law is founded on constitutive conventions, and that consequently moral values cannot determine what the law is. On the basis of a theory of socialconventions and an analysis of law's authoritative nature, the book sets out the scope of law in relation to moral and other critical values. The book also maintains, however, that moral

values are objective. It comprises a detailed analysis of the concept of objectivity, arguing that many aspectsof the law, and of moral values, are metaphysically objective.

Ethics Clarendon Press

Utilitarianism, the approach to ethics based on the maximization of overall well-being, continues to have great traction in moral philosophy and political thought. This Companion offers a systematic exploration of its history, themes, and applications. First, it traces the origins and development of utilitarianism via the work of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, and others. The volume then explores issues in the formulation of utilitarianism, including act versus rule utilitarianism, actual versus expected consequences, and objective versus subjective theories of well-being. Next, utilitarianism is positioned in relation to Kantianism and virtue ethics, and the possibility of conflict between utilitarianism and fairness is considered. Finally, the volume explores the modern relevance of utilitarianism by considering its practical implications for contemporary controversies such as military conflict and

global warming. The volume will be an important resource for all those studying moral philosophy, political philosophy, political theory, and history of ideas.

Positive Law and Objective Values

Oxford University Press

This collection of influential essays illustrates the range, depth, and importance of moral realism, the fundamental issues it raises, and the problems it faces.

The Emotional Construction of Morals

Oxford University Press on Demand

We must all make choices about how we want to live. We evaluate our possibilities by relying on historical, moral, personal, political, religious, and scientific modes of evaluations, but the values and reasons that follow from them conflict.

Philosophical problems are forced on us when we try to cope with such conflicts. There are reasons for and against all proposed ways of coping with the conflicts, but none of them has been generally accepted by reasonable thinkers. The constructive aim of *The Nature of Philosophical Problems* is to propose a way of understanding the nature of such philosophical problems,

explain why they occur, why they are perennial, and propose a pluralist approach as the most reasonable way of coping with them. This approach is practical, context-dependent, and particular. It follows from it that the recurrence of philosophical problems is not a defect, but a welcome consequence of the richness of our modes of understanding that enlarges the range of possibilities by which we might choose to live. The critical aim of the book is to give reasons against both the absolutist attempt to find an overriding value or principle for resolving philosophical problems and of the relativist claim that reasons unavoidably come to an end and how we want to live is ultimately a matter of personal preference, not of reasons.

A World Without Values OUP USA

An insight into moral skepticism of the 20th century. The author argues that our every-day moral codes are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity.

Ethics Oxford University Press

Utilitarianism considered both as a theory of personal morality and a theory of public choice.

Moral Error Theory OUP Oxford

Cheryl Misak offers a strikingly new view of the development of philosophy in the twentieth century. Pragmatism, the home-grown philosophy of America, thinks of truth not as a static relation between a sentence and the believer-independent world, but rather, a belief that works. The founders of pragmatism, Peirce and James, developed this idea in more (Peirce) and less (James) objective ways. The standard story of the reception of American pragmatism in England is that Russell and Moore savaged James's theory, and that pragmatism has never fully recovered. An alternative, and underappreciated, story is told here. The brilliant Cambridge mathematician, philosopher and economist, Frank Ramsey, was in the mid-1920s heavily influenced by the almost-unheard-of Peirce and was developing a pragmatist position of great promise. He then transmitted that pragmatism to his friend Wittgenstein, although had Ramsey lived past the age of 26 to see what Wittgenstein did with that

position, Ramsey would not have like what he saw.

Ethics Springer Nature

Can we have objective knowledge of right

and wrong, of how we should live and what there is reason to do? Can it be anything but luck when our beliefs are true? Kieran Setiya confronts these

questions in their most compelling and articulate forms, and argues that if there is objective ethical knowledge, human nature is its source.

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