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The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

Bombing to Win

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## TRISTIAN JORDON

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*The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy* Harvard University Press

As a concept, deterrence has launched a thousand books and articles. It has dominated Western strategic thinking for more than four decades. In this important and groundbreaking new book, Lawrence Freedman develops a distinctive approach to the evaluation of deterrence as both a state of mind and a strategic option. This approach is applied to post-cold war crisis management, and the utility and relevance of the concept is addressed in relation to US strategic practice post-9/11, particularly in the light of the apparent preference of the Bush Administration for the alternative concept of pre-emption. The study of deterrence has been hampered by the weight of the intellectual baggage accumulated since the end of the Second World War. Exaggerated notions of what deterrence might achieve were developed, only to be knocked down by academic critique. In this book, Freedman charts the evolution of the contemporary concept of deterrence, and discusses whether - and how - it still has relevance in today's world. He considers constructivist as well as realist approaches and draws on criminological as well as strategic studies literature to develop a concept of a norms-based, as opposed to an interest-based, deterrence. This book will be essential reading for students of politics and international relations as well as all those interested in contemporary strategic thought.

Bombing to Win Routledge

"Every War Must End" analyzes the many critical obstacles to ending a war -- an aspect of military strategy that is frequently and tragically overlooked. Ikli considers a variety of examples from twentieth-century history and examines specific strategies that effectively "won the peace." In the new preface, Ikli explains how U.S. political decisions and military strategy and tactics in Iraq have delayed, and indeed jeopardized, a successful end to hostilities.

**Arms and Influence** Routledge

Shows how targeting decisions have reflected the judgments of various American administrations on what will and won't deter a nuclear attack.

**Arms and Influence** Princeton University Press

"This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing."-- Gordon A. Craig, New York Times Book Review Originally published more than fifty years ago, this landmark book explores the ways in which military capabilities--real or imagined--are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. Anne-Marie Slaughter's new introduction to the work shows how Schelling's framework--conceived of in a time of superpowers and mutually assured destruction--still applies to our multipolar world, where wars are fought as much online as on the ground.

How Statesmen Think Oxford University Press

From Iraq to Bosnia to North Korea, the first question in American foreign policy debates is

increasingly: Can air power alone do the job? Robert A. Pape provides a systematic answer.

Analyzing the results of over thirty air campaigns, including a detailed reconstruction of the Gulf War, he argues that the key to success is attacking the enemy's military strategy, not its economy, people, or leaders. Coercive air power can succeed, but not as cheaply as air enthusiasts would like to believe. Pape examines the air raids on Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq as well as those of Israel versus Egypt, providing details of bombing and governmental decision making. His detailed narratives of the strategic effectiveness of bombing range from the classical cases of World War II to an extraordinary reconstruction of airpower use in the Gulf War, based on recently declassified documents. In this now-classic work of the theory and practice of airpower and its political effects, Robert A. Pape helps military strategists and policy makers judge the purpose of various air strategies, and helps general readers understand the policy debates.

War's Logic Cambridge University Press

With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.

**Atomic Obsession** Stanford University Press

Robert Jervis has been a pioneering leader in the study of the psychology of international politics for more than four decades. *How Statesmen Think* presents his most important ideas on the subject from across his career. This collection of revised and updated essays applies, elaborates, and modifies his pathbreaking work. The result is an indispensable book for students and scholars of international relations. *How Statesmen Think* demonstrates that expectations and political and psychological needs are the major drivers of perceptions in international politics, as well as in other arenas. Drawing on the increasing attention psychology is paying to emotions, the book discusses how emotional needs help structure beliefs. It also shows how decision-makers use multiple shortcuts to seek and process information when making foreign policy and national security judgments. For example, the desire to conserve cognitive resources can cause decision-makers to look at misleading indicators of military strength, and psychological pressures can lead them to run particularly high risks. The book also looks at how deterrent threats and counterpart promises often fail because they are misperceived. *How Statesmen Think* examines how these processes play out in many situations that arise in foreign and security policy, including the threat of inadvertent war, the development of domino beliefs, the formation and role of national identities, and conflicts between intelligence organizations and policymakers.

Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays Cambridge University Press

An illuminating insight into the work of Thomas Schelling, one of the most influential strategic thinkers of the nuclear age. By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the United States' early forays into Vietnam, he had become one of the most distinctive voices in Western strategy. This

book shows how Schelling's thinking is much more than a reaction to the tensions of the Cold War. In a demonstration that ideas can be just as significant as superpower politics, Robert Ayson traces the way this Harvard University professor built a unique intellectual framework using a mix of social-scientific reasoning, from economics to social theory and psychology. As such, this volume offers a rare glimpse into the intellectual history which underpins classical thinking on nuclear strategy and arms control - thinking which still has an enormous influence in the early twenty-first century.

#### **Strategy and Arms** Rand Corporation

Arms and Influence explores the complex relationship between technology, policymaking, and international norms. Modern technological innovations such as the atomic bomb, armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and advanced reconnaissance satellites have fostered debates about the boundaries of international norms and legitimate standards of behavior. These advances allow governments new opportunities for action around the world and have, in turn, prompted a broader effort to redefine international standards in areas such as self-defense, sovereignty, and preemptive strikes. In this book, Jeffrey S. Lantis develops a new theory of norm change and identifies its stages, including redefinition (involving domestic political deliberations) and constructive norm substitution (in multilateral institutions). He deftly takes some of the most controversial new developments in military technologies and embeds them in international relations theory. The case evidence he presents suggests that periods of change are underway across numerous different issue areas.

*The End of Strategic Stability?* Cambridge University Press

Bundy, a former special assistant for national security under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, explores the history of the nuclear bomb.

*Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO* Princeton University Press

All of the essays in this new collection by Thomas Schelling convey his unique perspective on individuals and society. Schelling, a 2005 Nobel Prize winner, has been one of the four or five most important social scientists of the past fifty years, and this collection shows why.

#### **Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy** Polity

How professionalization and scholarly "rigor" made social scientists increasingly irrelevant to US national security policy To mobilize America's intellectual resources to meet the security challenges of the post-9/11 world, US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates observed that "we must again embrace eggheads and ideas." But the gap between national security policymakers and international relations scholars has become a chasm. In *Cult of the Irrelevant*, Michael Desch traces the history of the relationship between the Beltway and the Ivory Tower from World War I to the present day. Recounting key Golden Age academic strategists such as Thomas Schelling and Walt Rostow, Desch's narrative shows that social science research became most oriented toward practical problem-solving during times of war and that scholars returned to less relevant work during peacetime. Social science disciplines like political science rewarded work that was methodologically sophisticated over scholarship that engaged with the messy realities of national security policy, and academic culture increasingly turned away from the job of solving real-world problems. In the name of scientific objectivity, academics today frequently engage only in basic research that they hope will somehow trickle down to policymakers. Drawing on the lessons of this history as well as a unique survey of current and former national security policymakers, Desch offers concrete

recommendations for scholars who want to shape government work. The result is a rich intellectual history and an essential wake-up call to a field that has lost its way.

*The Strategy of Conflict* Anchor

Escalation is a natural tendency in any form of human competition, and today's security environment demands that the United States be prepared for a host of escalatory threats. This analysis of escalation dynamics and approaches to escalation management draws on a range of historical examples from World War I to the struggle against global Jihad to inform escalation-related decisionmaking.

#### **Modernity and Its Discontents** Princeton University Press

This collection of essays reflects the proceedings of a 1991 conference on "The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s," sponsored by the USAF and Tufts University. The 20 contributors comment on the pivotal role of airpower in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the USAF, such as the factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of airpower as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry's views on what the Air Force of the future will set as its acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century. The contributors include academics, high-level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors.

*Prisoner's Dilemma* Oxford University Press

A masterful work of science writing that's "both a fascinating biography of von Neumann, the Hungarian exile whose mathematical theories were building blocks for the A-bomb and the digital computer, and a brilliant social history of game theory and its role in the Cold War and nuclear arms race" (San Francisco Chronicle). Should you watch public television without pledging?...Exceed the posted speed limit?...Hop a subway turnstile without paying? These questions illustrate the so-called "prisoner's dilemma", a social puzzle that we all face every day. Though the answers may seem simple, their profound implications make the prisoner's dilemma one of the great unifying concepts of science. Watching players bluff in a poker game inspired John von Neumann—father of the modern computer and one of the sharpest minds of the century—to construct game theory, a mathematical study of conflict and deception. Game theory was readily embraced at the RAND Corporation, the archetypical think tank charged with formulating military strategy for the atomic age, and in 1950 two RAND scientists made a momentous discovery. Called the "prisoner's dilemma," it is a disturbing and mind-bending game where two or more people may betray the common good for individual gain. Introduced shortly after the Soviet Union acquired the atomic bomb, the prisoner's dilemma quickly became a popular allegory of the nuclear arms race. Intellectuals such as von Neumann and Bertrand Russell joined military and political leaders in rallying to the "preventive war" movement, which advocated a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. Though the Truman administration rejected preventive war the United States entered into an arms race with the Soviets and game theory developed into a controversial tool of public policy—alternately accused of justifying arms races and touted as the only hope of preventing them. Prisoner's Dilemma is the incisive story of a revolutionary idea that has been hailed as a landmark of

twentieth-century thought.

*Moving Targets* Yale University Press

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*The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War* Georgetown University Press

Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke is best known for his direction of the German/Prussian campaigns against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-71, yet it was during his service as chief of the General Staff that he laid the foundation for the German way of war which would continue through 1945. Professor Daniel Hughes of the Air War College, in addition to editing and assisting with the translation of this selection of Moltke's thoughts and theories on the art of war, has written an insightful commentary on "Moltke the Elder" that places him in the broader context of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz's sometimes abstract philosophical ideas. The book also contains an extensive bibliographic and historiographic commentary that includes references to Moltke and his theories in the current literature in Germany, England, and the United States—a valuable aid to anyone doing research on the subject. This volume, in addition to its appeal to scholars, serves as an introduction to the theory of the German army, as well as a summary of Moltke's enduring theoretical legacy. Praise for Moltke on the Art of War "Moltke molded the Prussian and ultimately the German army at a time of technological and economic change. For that reason . . . this book deserves a much wider audience than those interested in nineteenth-century military history. Readers will be particularly grateful for the editor's careful explanation of terms that

are easily mistranslated in English, and for concise and useful footnotes and bibliography. A model of fine editing."—Foreign Affairs Magazine "This valuable work ably compiles the selected writings on the art of war of one of military history's greatest geniuses. [Moltke's] impact on American military thinking persists, especially in various military staff college curricula. Strongly recommended."—Armed Forces Journal "A thoughtfully edited, well-translated anthology that merits a place in any serious collection on the craft of war in the modern Western world."—Journal of Military History

**Theory of Strategy** DIANE Publishing

During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today's international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.

*Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction* Cornell University Press

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes.

*The Dynamics of Coercion* Presidio Press

Weaponry does not equal strategy, argues Colin Gray, but the two are often confused, resulting in such linguistic errors as strategic weapons. There may be an interactive relationship between policy, strategy and weaponry but, he contends, policy and strategy always take the front seat.

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